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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY 
DISTRICT, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
WILLARD A.SKEEN, JOHN G.BRAEGGER, 
ELSIE L. BRAEGGER, his wife, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
8803 
Case No. 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court 
of Box Elder County on a verdict for $80,000 in an action to 
condemn land for use in the construction of the Willard Dam 
and Reservoir, a part of the Weber Basin Reclamation Project. 
The action was filed against thirty-one landowners; however, 
this appeal involves only the property of the defendants, John 
G. Braegger and Elsie L. Broagger, his wife. When the word 
''defendants" is used, it refers only to Mr. and Mrs. Braegger. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
John G. Braegger and Elsie L. Braegger, his wife, are 
owners of 17 4.4 acres of farm and pasture land near the town 
of Willard, in Box Elder County, and mountain range land 
northeast of Willard (see Exhibit 1). They also own a dwelling 
house in Willard and outbuildings consisting of barns, feeding 
shed, milking sheds, granary, a silo, a lounging shed, corrals 
and several small buildings. Prior to the filing of this action, 
Mr. Braegger operated a dairy; milking an average of thirty 
cows (R. 17), and operated a beef cattle business of about 150 
head (R. 19). His farm land consists of 75 to 100 acres of 
((tillable" land and the remainder of his 174.4 acres is meadow 
pasture land. All but 36.79 acres of his 17 4.4 acres of land is 
condemned. The remaining land shown on Exhibit 1 ( un-
colored) is pasture and meadow. (R. 39, 40). The only build-
ings and improvements located on the land condemned consist 
of a small milk shed and a corral located on the old Central 
Pacific right-of-way in the lower fields. The dwelling house 
and the other buildings mentioned above are located in Willard 
and are not taken. The farm buildings are involved in this action 
because of the contention of the defendants that the taking 
of all tillable farm land and a substantial part of the meadow 
and pasture land resulted in a diminution in the value of such 
buildings. 
It was stipulated in the pretrial hearing, after reading the 
numerous defenses in the answer, that the only issues in the 
case were the issues of value of the land taken, and damages 
to the remaining property (Pre-trial R. p. 7). 
Two witnesses testified for the defendant as to value of 
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the land and improvements taken and severance damages, John 
G. Braegger, one of the defendants, and Joseph A. Capener. 
The defendant, Braegger, testified that the value of the land 
taken was $160,000 (R. 30, 31), but on cross examination, he 
testified that $80,000 of the $160,000 was for putting him and 
his family out of business (R. 35). Mr. Capener testified that 
the value of the land taken and damages amounted to $109,7 40 
(R. 59). This figure included 40 acres at $1,209 per acre and 
8 acres at $1,210 per acre (R. 60, 137). The witness testified 
that he had arrived at the value on the basis of fill dirt at five 
cents per yard (R. 13 7). Upon motion of the plaintiff, this 
evidence was stricken from the record (R. 138). Mr. Capener's 
testimony was then revised as follows: 
Tract No. 2 123 acres: 
20 acres at $100 ------------------------$ 2,000 
23 acres at 300 ------------------------ 6,900 
75 acres at 600 ------------------------ 45,000 
5 acres at 2 00 ------------------------ 1, 000 
Total Tract 2 --------------------------------
Tract No. 1 17.5 acres: 
17.5 acrs at $600 ------------------------$10,5 00 
Improvements _______________________________________________ _ 
Severance ______________ ------------------------------ None 
$54,900.00 
10,500.00 
12,500.00 
None 
Total -------------------------------------------- $77,900.00 
Plaintiff called two experts on the matter of value and 
severance damages. George W. Smith testified that the fair 
market value of the land taken on severance was $44,969 
rounded out to $45,000 (R .. 204). Bert Waddel testified that 
the fair market value of the land taken was $42,642 (R. 262), 
and damages due to the diminution in value of the farm build-
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ings not taken was $5,000 (R. 273) making a total of $47,642. 
He testified that there would be no severance damage to the 
36.79 acre tract of land not taken in view of the stipulation in 
the record that the plaintiff would construct a road and ditch 
to such land around the north end of the dike (R. 262) . 
It was evident from the remarks of members of the jury in 
the early part and throughout the trial that they were prejudiced 
and were interested only in finding reasons for making as high 
and award as possible. They interrupted the trial to ask ques-
tions as follows: 
"JUROR RICH: Should we know whether those flowing 
wells are going to be an asset to the government on this deal 
they're bui.lding? (R. 178). 
THE COURT: Now, I'm glad you asked that question. 
I'll tell you now, and I've got it written out in longhand here. 
You can't consider any benefit which the government may get 
out of this. It's the loss that Mr. Braegger is sustaining. 
JUROR RICH: Why can't we? 
THE COURT: Well, because the wisdom of the ages-
JUROR RICH: Oh, nuts. 
THE COURT: -has told us that that has to be it. I didn't 
ask you, but Mr. Mason or Mr. Skeen or somebody asked you 
if you'd take my instructions at the beginning of the case, and 
now you're beginning to understand some of the things we've 
been thrashing over while you've been out. You can't consider 
the benefits that will accrue to Ogden City or Layton or Bounti-
ful or some big corporation that might use this water. It's the 
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damage which Mr. Braegger sustains. That has to be the rule, 
and, ladies and gentlemen, very seriously speaking, the wisdom 
of ages and hundreds of years of experience in these kind of 
cases shows that this rule is the best rule. And it's fair to both 
sides. So you can't consider any benefits. I'm glad you asked 
the question. It's very proper, and it's one of the things that 
counsel are going to argue. 
JUROR RICH: Well, that would take up the question of 
the gravel then ( R. 179) . 
THE COURT: That's it. 
JUROR RICH: May I ask at this time, what was the 
Noble case decision that was quoted? 
THE COURT: We've been talking about that while you've 
been away. 
JUROR RICH: Well, you should have left us here. 
THE COURT: I know, but you're a woman. You're like 
my wife. You want to know everything that goes on all the 
time. I say that facetiously. 
JUROR RICH: Well, you expect us to decide. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to tell you what the law 
is. You'll have to accept that, and I'll tell you right now that it 
must be based on the damage to Mr. Braegger. The damage 
that he sustained, and not any benefits that this plaintiff may 
get. If they got some sand or gravel or something like that and 
it's worth a million dollars to them, it's none of your business, 
none of our business. I shouldn't say none of your business. 
It's none of our business. 
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JUROR RICH: Well, it ought to be Mr. Braegger's. 
THE COURT: That isn't the rule, Mrs. Rich. The rule is 
what will justly compensate Mr. Braegger for what he had 
prior to the time that these people came on the scene. Now, 
we've thrashed this all over back and forth and we're all worn 
out from last night from when we quit, and we're all agreed 
that is the law. Even Mr. Mason will have to nod his head to 
that. Nod your head, George. All right, anything else? 
MR. MASON: That's all with Mr. Braegger. 
THE COURT: I should add, in fairness to Mr. Braegger 
now, he's entitled to just compensation based on the time prior 
to these people coming on the scene. Of a buyer who was willing 
and able to buy from Mr. Braegger under conditions when he 
was willing but not required to sell. 
JUROR RICH: Well, now, may I raise a question here? 
It's probably not relevant (R. 180). 
THE COURT: You go ahead. 
JUROR RICH: This is in regard to income taxes. Mr. 
Braegger is going to have to have to pay on the sale of this 
property. Is he given any benefit from a forced sale where 
he doesn't have to report it? 
THE COURT: Well, I guess maybe I can answer that 
by saying he is providing he takes the money within a certain 
length of time and reinvests it in property of a similar nature. 
Then he's protected under the income tax law. At least that's 
n1y understanding of the law. But that's no concern of yours, 
except I will tell you that he can reinvest it. 
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JUROR RICH: No other recourse on a forced sale as far 
as income tax is concerned ? 
THE COURT: The income tax law specifically says that 
on a forced sale the property ovvner can reinvest his money 
in the same kind of land in this or other communities -vvithin six 
months is it, Mr. Skeen ? 
MR. SKEEN: A year. 
JUROR RICH: Well, anyone can do that. 
THE COURT: Without payment of income tax on the 
amount you receive. 
A JUROR: A farmer don't have a year to replace it. 
THE COURT: Well, but this is a special rule relating to 
condemnation. 
JUROR RICH: Doesn't it apply to everybody then? 
JUROR MUNNS: Everybody can reinvest and trade 
property. 
THE COURT: It doesn't apply to the Utah income tax. 
You sell your home and buy another one within six months or 
a year and you'll pay the Utah tax. We've got off on collateral 
things. There's no penalty to Mr. Braegger providing he puts 
his money back in the same kind of a business. If he buys a gas 
station or a bank or something, he' 11 probably have something 
to pay. It goes to so1ne other business. 
JUROR MUNNS: He wouldn't be buying it if he wasn't 
forced. 
THE COURT: That's right. That's a proper question. It's 
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a practical question, Mr. Skeen. Officially speaking, I have to 
tell you that's collateral tp what we're inquiring into here. 
JUROR MUNNS: Well, we've discussed it, anyway. 
THE COURT: That's fine. I expected you would. 
JUROR SORENSEN: If he decides to keep his money, 
I understood with the witness Mr. Capener he'd have sufficient 
tneans to keep him the rest of his life. 
JUROR MUNNS: Well, if the government takes half he 
won't. 
THE COURT: If he doesn't reinvest that in some other 
real property within six months or a year, then there may be 
some income tax features. Now, that's the angle that Mrs. 
Rich was asking about. 
JUROR NELSON: Have to give half of it back again" 
(R. 182). 
THE COURT: I think I'll tell Mrs. Rich that we've had 
a whole lot of lawsuits in this state involving condemnation 
proceedings. There's been many in this county, and there will 
be many after this case is over with. Now, the Noble case was 
a case brought by the State Road Commission (R. 186). 
MR. MASON: Well, I object-
THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to go into it on other 
matters, but I wanted Mrs. Rich to know that the Noble case 
was brought by the State Road Commission, and the case was 
appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court said 
the Judge down there didn't instruct the jury properly and 
10 
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certain evidence was received separately which should not have 
been received. Now that's one of the last pronouncements 
from the highest court, and it had some bearing on the way 
the questions were asked here in court. Now, that's all there 
is to that. I could name several and Mr. Skeen could perhaps 
name more than I have, and 11r. Mason and Mr. Foley could 
nan1e many, but they're all used as guides and beacon lights. 
However, this is the first case in our District involving this kind 
of a proceeding. We're pioneering, and for the benefit of all 
of you, you just as well know there may be, if all these cases 
are tried, there may be fifty or a hundred after you, and this is 
a kind of a pioneer case and we're taking it kind of easy. The 
Judge don't like to be spanked by these higher courts for telling 
you what the law is, and counsel have been very helpful. We've 
had a conference or two and that explains what we were doing 
yesterday. We could try this case hastily, and then two years 
from now the high court kick it out for error. Yes, Mr. Munns. 
JUROR MUNNS: Well, then, these other cases pending, 
they could ride pretty heavy on the way this one goes, is that 
right? 
THE COURT: Yeah, for the purpose of negotiation, that's 
right. But not for the purpose of trial. I guess that's a fai1 
statement" (R. 187). 
((A JUROR: Can we ask any questions? (R. 337). 
THE COURT: If it relates to damages, yes, I' 11 take a 
question. But if you're going to ask sotnething about the law 
or why something wasn't done this way or that way, I'll meet 
you on the street corner after it's over with and tell you. May 
11 
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the juror state a question if it relates to the matter of damages 
or amounts or values ? 
A JUROR: It relates-now, if it don't you can say no, but 
it relates to piling up a man's life income and unloading it, 
does he have an easement of years to pay income on that, or 
does-if he should replace it? 
MR. MASON: I think that's a pertinent question. 
THE COURT: Well, I started to give you a dissertation 
on that subject the other day. 
A JUROR: You never finished it. 
THE COURT: I didn't, and I'm not going to finish it, 
because the rules won't permit me to. There's nothing in my 
instructions covering the subject except I can say this: that 
whatever amount is awarded, if ultimately approved, will be 
paid in one lump sum. 
MR. SKEEN: That's right. 
A JUROR: That's the question. 
THE COURT: One check. 
A JUROR: And it means like unloading thirty years wheat 
crop all in one. 
THE COURT: Well, that's a matter of-
MR. MASON: That can be worked out. 
THE COURT: Have I answered your question? It will 
be one payment on one day. 
A JUROR: Okeh, that's all I wanted to know" (R. 338). 
12 
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CIJUROR RICH: Now may a juror ask a question? 
(R. 340). 
THE COURT: State the question now and we'll see what 
it is. 
JUROR RICH: Well, I think it's in order. You said ac-
cording to what the property was or could be adaptable. 
THE COURT: That's right. 
JUROR RICH: All right. You have hinted and made 
references to some of this said gravel on the place, and we'd 
like a little clarification. 
THE COURT: I think I had better talk to counsel in 
chambers and we can clarify it maybe. I'm not taking the 
words back, though. The word "adaptable" will stay in there, 
and you'll have to apply it. Maybe I can clarify it a little bit. 
It was put in there for a purpose. 
JUROR RICH: It seems to me it's an asset of that land, 
and if you're taking it away forever there's something there. 
THE COURT: It's in there, and maybe I can clarify it. If 
we can't agree, I won't, and you'll have to get the significance 
of what I said to you. 
JUROR RICH: Are there any other stipulations we haven't 
been told? 
THE COURT: Yes, Mrs. Rich. This lawsuit started on 
July eighth and we've had a multitude of sessions here and 
there have been a multitude of questions passed on, none of 
which has any direct bearing on the question of damages. I'll 
13 
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talk to counsel in chambers and 1na ybe I can clarify it. I tnight 
be able to clarify it, but I won't withdraw it. 
·JUROR RICH: You mean that ((adaptable"? 
TI-IE COURT: That's right. That's going to stay in there 
for what significance you draw by it. 
JUROR RICH: Well, if you leave that word ('adaptable" 
in there, we should be given some accurate information about 
the quality of that stuff. 
THE COURT: Well, there are lots of things I think 
about lawsuits, Mrs. Rich, but I just sit here and listen to the 
evidence, and that's what you're going to have to do, is decide 
the case on the evidence. 
JUROR RICH: Well, we need more evidence. 
Oral instructions were given to the jury throughout the 
trial. Exception was taken by the plaintiff. 
The court subtnitted the follo"\\t·ing form of special verdict 
to the jury, and the answers were inserted by the jury as indi-
cated: 
* * * * 
IN TI-IE DISTRICT COURT FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY, 
UTAH 
WEBER BASIN WATER CON- ) 
SERVANCY DISTRICT, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. 
JOl-IN G. BRAEGGER and wife 
Defendants. 
14 
) 
) 
) 
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We, the jury, duly impanelled and sworn, return the fol-
lowing Special Verdict: 
1. What was the value of the 122.86 acres and all improve-
ments thereon appertaining to the realty? (Answer in dollars). 
Answer: $58,000.00. 
2. What was the damage, if any ,which will accrue to the 
36.79 acres not being condemned, by reason of its severance 
from the lands referred to in the previous question? (Answer 
in dollars) . 
Answer: $1850.00. 
3. What was the value of the 14.75 acres and all improve-
ments thereon appertaining to the realty? (Answer in dollars). 
Answer: $8850.00. 
4. How much will the barns, sheds, corrals, and other 
buildings and improvements, not on the premises heretofore 
referred to, belonging to the John Braeggers and used in their 
livestock operations, be damaged, if at all, by the taking of the 
land described in the complaint? 
Answer: $11,300.00. 
DATED this 14th day of October, 1957. 
Is/ MARGUERITE RICH 
Jury Foreman 
A motion for a new trial was filed by the plaintiff attacking 
the verdict on the grounds ( 1) excessive damages appear to 
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice; 
(2) there is no competent evidence in th record supporting 
the answer to paragraph No. 2 of the Special Verdict; and 
( 3) Errors in law occurred at the trial. The court erred in giving 
oral instructions in answer to questions asked by individual 
1.5 
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jurors throughout the course of the trial. The court erred in 
giving Instruction No. 15 (last instruction). 
The 1notion was denied and a judgment was entered on 
the verdict. 
STATE1\1ENT OF POINTS 
1. Excessive damages appear to have been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice. 
2. There is no competent evidence supporting the award 
of severance damages to the 36.79 acres of land not taken. 
3. The court erred in giving oral instructions throughout 
the trial. 
ARGUMENT 
1. EXCESSIVE DAMAGES APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN 
GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION OR PRE-
JUDICE. 
One of the grounds for a new trial v;as that it appeared 
that excessive damages were awarded under the influence of 
passion or prejudice. It is apparent from the reading of the 
record and particularly the part quoted above that several 
rnen1bers of the jury -vvere seeking ways to make the verdict 
as high as possible. During the examination of the defendant, 
John G. Braegger, and before any evidence \vas introduced 
by the plaintiff, metnbers of the jury asked such questions and 
n1ade such con1rnents as: 
16 
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1. nShould we know whether those flowing wells are 
going to be an asset of the government on this deal they're 
building?" (R. 178). 
2. uw ell that would take up the question of gravel then?" 
(R. 179). 
3. (!This is in regard to income taxes Mr. Braegger is going 
to have to pay on the sale of this property. Is he given any 
benefit from a forced sale when he doesn't have to report it?" 
(R. 180). 
4. (!Juror Sorensen: If he decides to keep this money, I 
understood from the witness Mr. Capener, he'd have sufficient 
if the government takes half he won't." 
5. "Have to give half of it back again." (R. 182). 
Later in the trial the following questions were asked and 
comments were made. 
6. "It relates-now, if it don't you can say no, but it 
relates to piling up a man's life income and unloading it, does 
he have an easement of years to pay income on that?" 
7. ((It means like unloading thirty years' wheat crop all in 
one" (R. 338). 
8. (!All right. You have hinted and made references to 
some of this said gravel on the place and we'd like a little 
clarification.-It seems to me its an asset of that land, and if 
you're taking it away forever there's something there" (R. 340). 
It will be noted from the above that the jury, despite 
repeated instructions and statements of the court, was concerned 
17 
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with such collateral matters as income tax on the amount 
awarded, a d~posit of gravel on the property, benefits to the 
governl?ent and whether the award would keep Mr. Braegger 
for the rest of his life. On the income tax matter, Juror Munns 
said, UWell, we've discussed it anyway." This is an unusual 
case for the reason that members of the jury blurted out state-
ments throughout the trial indicating how they were thinking 
about the case-and it was all bad for the appellant. It was 
unnecessary to get affidavits as to passion and prejudice, it 
was all shown in the record. 
Members of the jury showed disrespect for the court and 
his instructions by such comments as: 
1. ((Oh nuts" (R. 178). 
2. ({Well, you should have left us here" (R. 179). 
3. ((Well, it ought to be Mr. Braeggers" (R. 180). 
4. ({You never finished it" (R. 338). 
5. ((Are there any other stipulations we haven't been told?" 
(R. 340). 
6. ((You won't tell us anything, we're not going to tell you 
anything" (R. 347). 
The plaintiff, a public corporation, and the public whose 
tax money is spent by the plaintiff, were entitled to have the 
issues of value and damages tried to a fair and impartial jury. 
It is apparent that the jury in this case was interested in only 
one thing-how much can we award the defendants? Referring 
to the Special Verdict, one juror asked the question, ((Can you 
put tnore damages on the number four than it was appraised 
18 
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at?" (R. 347). It is obvious from the comments of members 
of the jury and the results that the jury did not weigh, and con-
sider the evidence offered by the expert appraisers, Smith and 
Waddel, but were simply taking the highest figure suggested, 
regardless of the source. The verdict was nearly double the 
Smith appraisal and exceeded the Capener appraisal. 
Despite the apparent prejudice, the trial court denied the 
plaintiff's motion for a new trial. This was reversible error. 
2. THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE SUP-
PORTING THE AWARD FOR SEVERANCE DAMAGES 
TO THE 36.79 ACRES OF LAND NOT TAKEN. 
As stated above, all of the defendant's farm land except 
36.79 acres of meadow-pasture land was condemned. The 
relative locations of the lands taken and the tract remaining 
is shown on the map, Exhibit 1. Mr. Capener, t~e defendant's 
expert, testified on direct examination that the taking of the 
land condemned would not diminish the value of the remain-
ing 36.79 acre tract (R. 62) . 
ttQ. What would you say would be the damage to that 
36.79 acres by being cut off from the other tract? 
A. I have no damage to it at all, because it's large enough 
a piece that I think he could find a buyer £or it, and I think 
he has ample water for it if the water is placed over there on 
the piece of ground. So that I don't think it would interfere 
with it." R. 62) . 
In an effort to be absolutely fair to the defendants and 
to minimize their damages, it was stipulated by the plaintiff 
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that a road and ditch would be constructed around the north 
end of the proposed dike to give the defendants full access 
to the 36.79 acre tract with no inconvience. The stipulation 
as follows: 
MR. SKEEN: ( (If the court please, and ladies and 
gentlemen of the jury, as Mr. Braegger indicated, we 
have worked out an arrangement with him, which he 
said last evening was satisfactory, for giving him access 
to water for the 36.79 acre tract. The plaintiff will con-
struct at its expense for Mr. Braegger a suitable ditch 
to carry water from Willow Creek around the north 
end of tract one marked in blue, along the north side 
of it, I should say, and down to the 36.79 acre tract. 
Proper diversion gates will be provided so that he 
can carry his water in the new ditch. Now, the new 
ditch will be constructed before the old ditch is de-
stroyed. So he will never at any time be without water 
for the tract of land that we're not taking. In addition 
to that, the plaintiff will permit Mr. Braegger to have 
possession of all of his property until May 1, 1958, 
subject only to the right of the plaintiff to have its engi-
neers go on the propery and survey and dig test holes 
or do whatever they need in connection with the con-
struction of the project. Third, the plaintiff will con-
struct a graded dirt farm road from the Union Pacific 
Railroad tracts on the Zundel property - that's the 
property just to the east of tract number one indicated 
on the map-around the dike and on the north side 
of the tract one to Mr. Braegger's 36.79 acre tract. 
So that he will at all times have access to the remaining 
property. That will be true also during construction. 
His right of access will not be disturbed. Now, fourth, 
that the plaintiff will construct a fence from the point 
on the northwest corner of tract number 15-A, indi-
cated by across n1ark along the heavy line easterly to 
the corner marked HX" immediately under the word 
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''tract" on the map, so that there will be no danger 
of Mr. Braegger' s cattle getting off the remaining land 
and onto the tract that the plaintiff is taking. Now, that 
may be considered in the record as a stipulation and 
condition under which the award of just compensation 
and damages will be made." (R. 164-165). 
MR. MASON: ((Now, Mr. Skeen, I might ask you one 
other question. How about the construction of diversion 
headgates where the water is going to be taken from 
Willow Creek or Mill Creek to the north?""'' 
MR. SKEEN: HW ell, I'll state that if we destroy the 
usefulness of his present headgate we'll replace it with 
a proper head gate so that he can divert the water. 
We're not going to build a ditch for him that long dis-
tance and then leave it so he can't get any water out 
of it." (R. 166). 
Mr. Wad del testified as follows with respect to the 36.79 
acre tract: 
''Q. Now, Mr. Waddel, you have considered, have 
you, the 36.79 acres of land which is not taken 
shown colored, or left plain white on the map ? 
(R. 262). 
A. Yes, sir. 
D. Did you look at that land? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, did you make a study to determine whether 
the taking of this area in blue would affect the 
valuation of the 36.79 acres ? 
A. I don't believe it will make any difference in the 
fair market sale price of the 36.79 acres that is 
left there. 
Q. Are you making that statement in the light of 
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.. our stipulation here that a ditch will be built 
around the north end of the dike? 
A. A ditch and a road. 
Q. And a road to serve it? 
A. Yes, sir, based on that. 
Q. So there will be access to it for water and by road? 
A. Yes, sir." 
There is no specific testimony in the record that after the 
stipulation was made there would be any damage at all to the 
36.79 acre tract, and in fact, the only specific evidence on the 
point prior to the stipulation is that of the defendants' expert, 
Mr. Capener, that there was no damage. 
The court .. erred in denying the plaintiff's timely motion 
to strike the items of damages to the remaining tract (R. 3 54). 
The point was raised again in the motion for a new trial (par. 2) 
and the trial court again erred in denying the motion. 
3. THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ORAL IN-
STRUCTIONS THROUGHOUT THE TRIAL CONTRARY 
TO RULE 51 OF THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Rule 51 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires instruc-
tions to the jury to be in writing nunless the parties stipulate 
that such instructions may be given orally-.'' It is uniform 
practice for the court to give the instructions after the close of 
the testitnony and before argument. In this case, as indicated 
by the parts of the record quoted above, the members of the 
jury were pennitted to interrupt the trial and to ask questions. 
'fhe court orally instructed the jury on the questions raised. 
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Most of the questions related to matters not properly before 
the jury, such as the liability of the defendants to pay income 
tax (R. 180, 3 38) , and the opinion of the Supreme Court of 
Utah in the Noble case (R. 187). The asking of the questions 
was entirely unexpected, and the oral answers of the court, 
except in one instance, were given without consultation with the 
attorneys. 
An exception was taken by the plaintiff to the oral instruc-
tions (R. 356). 
The rule is well settled that where a statute requtres 
written instructions, it is mandatory and not merely directory. 
In the case of Henderson v. Kessel, 116 S.E. 68, 93 W.Va. 60, 
the court said with reference to such a statute, (CTo hold it 
merely directory would be in effect to repeal it." The reasons 
for the rule that instructions must be in writing have been 
discussed by the courts. 
It is easily conceivable that during the course of a 
trial a verbal instruction ... would be wholly over-
looked and forgotten by a jury in the consideration of 
a case. Gause-Ware Funeral Home v. McGinley 
(Texas) 41 S.W. 2d 433, 435. 
The great object of the statute (requiring that in-
structions be in writing, is to prevent disputes between 
the judge and counsel as to what was the charge; and 
the only way to prevent them is to require the courts 
to conform rigidly to the statute. Fry v. Shehee, 55 Ga. 
208; Citizens Bank of Bainbridge v. Fort, 83 S.E. 235, 
142 Ga. 611. See also, Wheatley v. West, 61 Ga. 401; 
Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Arnold, 2 So. 3 3 7, 
80 Ala. 600, 609. 
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In the case of Henderson v. Kessel, supra, it was held that 
where the statute requires instructions to be in writing, it is 
error for the court to give an oral instruction to the jury, gov-
erning the matters in issue in a civil case, even though the 
instruction be correct as a matter of law. 
The giving of the oral instructions referred to above 
was clear! y contrary to the intent and purpose of Rule 51 and 
constituted reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
The questions asked by members of the jury relating to 
such subjects as income tax, payment in a lump sum, gravel 
deposits, and severance during the trial of the case indicated 
clearly that the jury was interested in building up as high a 
verdict as possible. Thts, together with the apparent contempt 
for the court's instructions, indicated passion and prejudice that 
prevented the plaintiff from having a fair trial of the issues. 
There was no evidence in the record supporting the answer 
to question No. 2 in the special verdict. In fact, the defendants' 
expert witness testified that there was no damage to the 36.79 
acre tract remaining. Therefore, the verdict cannot be sustained. 
The court gave numerous oral instructions contrary to 
Rule 51 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that 
the judgment of the district court must be reversed. 
E. J. SKEEN 
NEIL R. OLMSTEAD 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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